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Abstract 
Deception is thought to involve greater cognitive load than honesty, and in practice 
has been shown to increase reaction time (RT). However, this has only been 
measured with closed-questions delivered by a computer. We employed a dual-task 
methodology, the Detection Response Task (DRT), to assess cognitive load in a live, 
open-question interview. The DRT requires participants to press a button in response 
to a stimulus every 3-5 seconds while simultaneously performing a primary task. In 
this case, 44 first year Psychology students (29 females) aged 18-66 (M =  27.1 
years, SD = 10.6) watched 26 short films and constructed and delivered narrative lies 
about their content to an interviewer. Supporting our hypothesis that deception is 
cognitively harder than telling the truth, participants were significantly slower to 
respond to the DRT when constructing (M = 385, 95%CI[380,391], p <.05) and 
delivering (M = 541, 95%CI[531,550], p <.001) lies in the first half of the 
experiment. When lying, they were more likely to fail to respond to the stimulus 
altogether (by 0.3%) and took longer to start answering (by 33 ms). Further inquiry 
of the DRT in deception research may improve deception theory and refine lie-
detection techniques. 
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Deception is a deliberate attempt to mislead others (DePaulo et al., 2003) and 
people engage in deceptive behaviours on a daily basis (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, 
Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). These behaviours range widely, from relatively 
inconsequential white lies to more serious acts of dishonesty (DePaulo et al., 1996). 
Serious forms of deception, such as consumer scams, fraud, and theft from 
Government departments cost Australia upwards of 6 billion AUD per year (Smith, 
Jorna, Sweeney, & Fuller, 2014). Despite the familiarity of deception and its cost to 
us, there is no reliable method of detecting it. Detecting deception is challenging for 
a number of reasons; liars typically display small behavioural differences, 
deliberately act in ways to appear credible, embed their lies in truthful statements and 
some are often proficient at delivering lies in a believable way (Vrij, Granhag, & 
Porter, 2010). These issues have hampered the development of a reliable detection 
method but so too have the limitations inherent in the theories that attempt to explain 
deception. The majority of deception theories are driven by two key ideas: that 
telling lies is harder than telling the truth, and that people behave and speak 
differently when telling them. The limitations arise when attempting to explain why 
lying is harder and developing a consensus on how this difficulty is displayed 
behaviourally. 
Deception theory 
Early theories emphasised that lying was more difficult because of the 
emotions involved (Ekman & Frisen, 1969). The effort of trying to hide an emotional 
response was proposed to result in specific, overt, non-verbal behaviours (changes in 
micro-expressions in the face and movements in the hands and feet). The accuracy of 
these behaviours in discriminating deception was entirely anecdotal and no empirical 
support for these behaviours has yet been established (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). 
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Later theories moved beyond considering only the emotions involved by 
incorporating the role of cognition. The first was Zuckerman, DePaulo and 
Rosenthal’s (1981) Four-Factor model of deceptive behaviour. This model proposed 
that when lying, the emotions, arousal, cognitive effort, and attempts to conceal 
changes in behaviour were predictive of behavioural differences that would act as 
‘cues’ to deception. The cognitive effort derives from formulating lies that are both 
internally consistent, and consistent with what the person hearing the lie already 
knows. The behavioural cues predicted by these four factors included greater pupil 
dilation, taking longer to respond, hesitating more, and using hand gestures less to 
illustrate speech. 
Building on the Four-Factor model, the Interpersonal Deception Theory 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996) emphasised the role of two-way communication during 
deception. Deception is cognitively taxing because the deceiver must continually 
monitor their own behaviour and watch for any signs of suspicion from the person 
being lied to. The variability of goals, expectations, motivations, and relationships 
between people prevents there being any specific profile of deceptive cues, but 
deceivers improve with practice (displaying more composure and more fluent 
speech).  
Similarly, the Self-Presentation Theory predicted that liars would be less 
pleasant and engaging and tell less detailed and compelling lies (DePaulo et al., 
2003). This theory emphasised the role of impression management, or a liar’s 
attempts to control the impressions that the receiver makes of them. In developing 
this theory, they conducted a meta-analytic review of the performance of all 
previously proposed cues to deception (158 in total). Only 25 per cent of all 
behavioural cues were associated with deception and of the cues that were, the 
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average effect size was small (d = .25; DePaulo et al., 2003). In follow-up research, 
Bond and DePaulo (2006) investigated people’s accuracy in detecting deception 
when relying on these cues. They found both lay people and experts (including law 
enforcement personnel, auditors, and psychiatrists) performed at or below chance 
level. These results did not trigger an abandonment of these cue-based approaches. 
Instead, their research influenced a large body of work by Vrij and colleagues (2006) 
who sought ways to make cues more obvious.  
This Cognitive Load Approach involves applying measures that induce 
cognitive load on liars including making people recount their stories backward (Vrij 
et al., 2008), surprising them with unanticipated questions and tasks (Vrij, Granhag, 
Mann, & Leal, 2011), and forcing direct eye contact during interviews (Vrij, Mann, 
Leal, & Fisher, 2010). The proponents suggest they can detect deception with 
accuracy rates as high as 71% (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017).  The Cognitive Load 
Approach has been highly influential, but the authors have neither attempted to 
explain the cognitive mechanisms involved in the cues detected, nor formalised these 
ideas into a theory. Further, some authors have argued that the findings of Vrij and 
colleagues are overstated and go so far as to accuse them of engaging in debatable 
coding decisions and publication bias (Levine, Blair, & Carpenter, 2017). 
These deception theories have progressively built our understanding of 
deception, but they share a common flaw; while they all point to the role of 
cognition, none are explicit in describing the cognitive mechanisms involved. This 
flaw is partially responsible for the unreliability of behavioural cues in detecting 
deception. 
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Activation Decision Construction Model 
The first to attempt to explain the cognitive mechanisms involved in 
deception was via the Activation–Decision–Construction Model (ADCM; Walczyk, 
Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003). The ADCM relies on constructs from 
Baddeley’s Working Memory model (1992) and comprises three cognitive 
components: Activation, Decision, and Construction. The Activation component 
refers to recall of the truth in long-term memory (LTM), which is transferred to and 
maintained in working memory (WM). In the Decision component, the decision to 
lie is based on whether answering truthfully is in their self-interest. The decision to 
lie guides the central executive (an attention-controlling system; Baddeley, 1992) to 
inhibit the truth. The Construction component is based on the Construction-
Integration Model (Kintsch, 1998), where the truth acts as a retrieval cue to LTM. 
According to the Construction-Integration Model LTM is thought to consist of a 
network of semantic and episodic nodes. This network of nodes is drawn on to 
construct lies. Walczyk and colleagues (2003) argue that access to these nodes takes 
about 400ms, but their evidence for this estimate is based on an unpublished work. 
Attention at this stage acts to inhibit the truth, but also inhibits other potential lies 
that conflict with the social context (i.e., those that are implausible, unverifiable, or 
inconsistent with what has already been said). Deception, therefore, involves a 
conscious decision to deceive and constructing a plausible lie that is consistent with 
the context, all the while suppressing the truth. The model predicts that the cognitive 
load required to produce a lie results in taking longer to respond. 
The model was criticised, not only for its lack of detail, but also for the linear 
nature in which lie production was said to occur. The decision to deceive is unlikely 
to occur before a plausible lie is constructed. In light of criticisms, the theory was 
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updated to the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Model (ADCAT; Walczyk, 
Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014), which is now one of the most established theories of 
deception.  
The Activation Decision Construction Action Model  
ADCAT contains four key components. The Activation component is similar 
to that in ADCM but is extended to involve receiving signals from the social 
environment that indicate a truth is required. This can be implicit, such as a police 
officer approaching the driver side window of a car, or explicit, such as a direct 
question in a serious tone. At this stage, lying and truth telling are equal in their 
cognitive effort. Telling the truth only involves this stage, whereas lying involves the 
following additional components.  
The Decision component involves a quasi-rational decision-making process, 
weighing up the costs and benefits of a variety of truthful and deceitful responses. 
This includes weighing up the probability and potential consequences of each 
response. The process is quasi-rational because the analysis of these probabilities is 
likely inaccurate. The response with the most utility (or perceived utility given the 
time limit to respond and how clear-headed the person is) is the one chosen. This 
decision-making process becomes harder in complex or unfamiliar social contexts.  
The Construction component involves constructing a plausible, simple 
narrative that is embellished as necessary. It needs to be detailed enough, and 
convincing, without adding inconsistencies. The more frequently rehearsal occurs at 
this stage, the less cognitive load is required at delivery.  
The Action component is the delivery of the lie. Cognitive load at this stage 
increases as the person attempts to appear honest, checks for signs of suspicion from 
the person being lied to, and inhibits the truth. At this stage, the truth is thought to act 
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as a Stroop-like interference because honesty is cognitively easier than deception 
(Pennebaker & Chew, 1985).  
ADCAT has significant advantages over earlier theories in that it predicts 
behavioural cues to deception based on these specific cognitive mechanisms. Such 
cues include dilated pupils and taking longer to respond (which the authors argue are 
direct measures of cognitive load) as well as averting eye gaze, which reduces the 
visual stimuli sent to WM. In response to criticism about the non-linear nature of 
deceptive discourse, ADCAT assumes the four components occur simultaneously 
and automatically. 
The model also assumes that both the level of rehearsal and the motivation 
behind deception act as key moderating factors. Rehearsal, involves committing the 
lie to LTM, anticipating questions regarding the truth, and preparing responses that 
fit different social contexts. These actions reduce the cognitive load associated with 
deception. Greater motivation, leads liars to assign more resources to cognitive 
control, which reduces the exhibition of cues (Walcyck et al., 2014). Walczyk and 
colleagues (2013) demonstrated that greater rehearsal can reduce cognitive load to 
below that of telling the truth. While testing the role of rehearsal was straightforward 
in that study (by assigning participants to either a truth, rehearsed lie, or unrehearsed 
lie condition), testing the role of motivation is more challenging. Laboratory research 
can rarely mimic the high stakes that are associated with real-world deception. The 
consequences of the methods used (usually the risk of losing a monetary reward) do 
not match the consequences of failing to appear credible in forensic settings.  
Indeed, a second school of thought, the motivation impairment hypothesis 
(DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O’Brien, 1988), predicts the opposite to ADCAT. The 
motivation impairment hypothesis predicts that the more motivated the deceiver, the 
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greater the need to appear credible, increasing stress and the likelihood they will 
exhibit cues. DePaulo and colleagues (1988) demonstrated this by telling some 
participants that research shows skilled liars are more intelligent. They then asked 
participants to use deceit to gain approval when sharing political attitudes with a 
partner. Those who were convinced that good liars were more intelligent were more 
likely to display verbal and nonverbal cues to deception (though there was no report 
of which cues they displayed).  
To date, only one study has tested the mechanisms described in ADCAT. 
Masip, Blandon-Gitlin, de la Riva and Herrero (2016) investigated the Decision 
component by testing whether people use quasi-rational decision-making when lying. 
They gave participants hypothetical scenarios and asked them to indicate which of 
those they would lie or tell the truth about. Participants then rated the consequences 
of either lying or being honest and the probabilities of those consequences. The 
results were partially supportive of the ADCAT model; participants made decisions 
to lie in a quasi-rational way. In contrast to ADCAT, participants only considered the 
consequences of telling the truth, not of lying. This suggests that the additional load 
experienced at the Decision component may be smaller than ADCAT predicts.  
An exception to the rule  
Of all the theories of deception, only one contradicts the consensus that 
deception is cognitively harder than telling the truth. McCornack, Morrison, Paik, 
Wisner and Zhu (2014) argue that only when a number of conditions are met would 
deception be more cognitively demanding. Specifically, they postulate that lies are 
only harder when they contain the portrayal of complex information, are based on the 
retrieval of decayed semantic memories, and when there has been no opportunity to 
rehearse the delivery. They argue these conditions in concert are rare. Instead, they 
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argue deception only occurs if it is the path of least resistance. Deception is about 
problem solving, as efficiently as possible using the most easily accessible 
information. McCornack and colleagues (2014) argue that discourse, be it truthful or 
deceptive, occurs incrementally, using only brief micro-bursts of attention. These 
micro-bursts of attention do not induce enough cognitive load to make deception 
more difficult than honesty.  
Critics argue this theory only explains ‘everyday lies’ and is not applicable to 
‘high-stakes’ lies, which are associated with more severe personal cost (Walczyk et 
al., 2014). Yet, the motivations behind both types of lies are similar. Both are told for 
personal gain, to avoid punishment or to preserve relationships. The critics give no 
argument for why high-stakes deception requires constant rather than micro-bursts of 
attention, particularly if they have been well-rehearsed.  
Detecting Deception 
The above theories have had varying success in explaining why deception 
may be more difficult than truth telling and the last even rejects the idea. Theory is 
critical to understanding the continuing challenge of developing reliable detection 
methods. One example, the infamous polygraph, was developed in isolation from any 
theoretical account of deception. 
The polygraph test has the longest tradition of all deception-detection 
methods. It measures physiological responses associated with attention, stress and 
emotion, such as respiration, blood pressure and skin conductance (Meijer & 
Verschuere, 2015). Historically, results of these responses have been used to infer 
deceit. Today, it is widely accepted that lying has no unique physiological pattern 
(Meijer & Verschuere, 2015). The US National Research Council (2003) conducted 
a large-scale review of the polygraph and recommended against its use. In particular, 
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their criticisms focussed on a lack of evidence for its reliability. These criticisms 
failed to eliminate the practice. In Australia, police are permitted to use the 
polygraph, but any evidence gained is inadmissible in court (s 6(1) of the Lie 
Detectors Act of New South Wales). Regardless, research into the potential of the 
polygraph continues (Meijer & Verschuere, 2015).  
Equally infamous as the polygraph is the use of the behavioural cues 
described earlier.  Passively observing these behavioural cues is a technique used by 
law enforcement worldwide, including Australia (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & 
Merckelbach, 2016a). Of concern, are findings that police officers and the lay public 
are equally likely to believe in the veracity of cues that have no association with 
lying (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016b).  
Happily, there is growing evidence that using measures of cognitive 
workload may assist in developing deception detection techniques. The most direct 
method of measuring the cognitive effort involved in deception is to simply ask 
people which they find more difficult. People report that lying is harder (Caso, 
Gnisci, Vrij, & Mann, 2005). In support of these intuitive findings, there are also a 
range of indirect measures that support deception being more effortful. For example, 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have found greater activity in 
brain regions related to cognitive control (such as the prefrontal, parietal, and 
anterior cingulate cortex; Kozel et al., 2005; Kozel, et al., 2009; Nose, Murai, & 
Taira, 2009; Monteleone et al., 2009). Sceptics argue that using fMRI is no 
improvement on the polygraph; fMRI studies have similar predictive ability to the 
polygraph but involve much higher resources to operate (Spence, 2008).  
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Measuring deception with reaction times.  
Longer reaction time (RT) is associated with an increase in cognitive load, 
and evidence is growing that RT is a reliable measure of the increased cognitive load 
associated with deception (Suchotzki, Verschuere, Van Bockstaele, Ben-Shakhar, & 
Crombez, 2017). Early computerised studies adapted already-established RT 
paradigms for use in deception research but had disappointing results. For example, 
in an analogue of the Stroop task, half the participants committed a mock crime, then 
were given a description of that crime on a screen where every word was coloured 
one of four colours. Other participants were merely told a crime was committed and 
were given a description with irrelevant crime details. Participants named the colour 
of the word as quickly as possible and it was expected that those who committed the 
mock crime would be more distracted by the description and respond more slowly 
(Engelhard, Merchelbach, & van den Hout, 2003). They found no significant 
performance difference between the groups. Another early study used a dual task RT 
paradigm. After participating in a mock crime, participants were attached to a 
polygraph machine and viewed a series of either neutral photos or photos of the 
crime scene. Simultaneously, participants responded to an auditory tone by hitting 
the ‘space-bar’ on a keyboard. RTs to the auditory tone were expected to be slower 
when they coincided with crime scene photos, but no significant difference was 
observed (Verschere, Crombez, De Clercq, & Koster, 2004). The authors noted their 
design was limited by very few RT measurements.  
More promising results were achieved by studies that developed new 
deception-specific RT tasks. For example, the reaction time Concealed Information 
Task asks participants whether they recognise critical details usually about a crime or 
themselves (Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000). They are instructed to 
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hide certain information and to respond to questions either truthfully or deceitfully. 
Similarly, the autobiographical Implicit Association Test, involves requesting 
respondents to indicate either TRUE or FALSE to a set of personal statements 
(Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008). The Sheffield Lie Test 
(Spence et al., 2001) presents 20 statements to which participants are instructed to lie 
or tell the truth depending on a cue (such as, lie to all questions coloured blue). The 
time it takes them to respond is assumed to indicate the relative cognitive load 
involved. 
A meta-analysis of these tasks found that overall, deception was associated 
with a longer average RT than truth-telling, with a mean difference of 115 ms 
(Suchotzki et al., 2017). Specifically, lying took 49 ms longer in the Concealed 
Information Task, 149 ms longer in the autobiographical Implicit Association Test, 
and 180 ms longer in the Sheffield Lie Test. They found a large effect size over 73 
studies d = 1.26 after eliminating between-subject designs and correcting for 
publication bias. They also controlled for the moderating effects of both motivation 
and rehearsal and found the effect of both was minimal.  
The limits to measuring deception with RT 
Although these paradigms have promising results, the practice is imperfect. 
Critics have suggested that RTs are under voluntary control and are therefore 
unsuitable for lie-detection (Sip et al., 2013). Further, RTs are highly variable, and 
require a large number of trials for reliability. Suchotzki and colleagues (2017) 
propose a minimum of 20 observations for each condition. Most of the designs 
described rarely meet this minimum.  
The critical issue is that the methods described only measure the time it takes 
to produce a binary response either Yes, No, or True, False. The problem with these 
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responses is that it assumes a model of deception where people produce one of two 
extremes: a “bold-face lie”, or a “bold-face truth” delivered in one-word answers 
(McCornack et al., 2014). McCornack and colleagues (2014) argue that few people 
produce lies in this way. Deception involves covertly violating conversational rules 
in an indefinite number of ways. More importantly, deception involves producing 
multiple sentences, not just one-word answers (McCornack et al., 2014). Therefore, 
these designs do not measure natural lying discourse. 
The use of open-ended questions could resolve this problem. Answering an 
open-ended question should require greater cognitive effort because it involves 
greater searching of LTM for information (Kintsch, 1998). It also involves all the 
other load inducing factors in ADCAT’s Construction and Action components such 
as inhibiting the truth, inhibiting implausible lies, and maintaining a convincing 
performance.  
Walczyk and colleagues (2003) did consider this when testing the original 
ADCM. They used a between-subjects design, allocating participants to three 
conditions; lie, tell the truth, or choose to lie or tell the truth to a list of questions. 
Some questions were closed requiring answers of “yes”, or “no”, such as “do you 
wear glasses?” and some questions were open requiring an answer of one or two 
words, such as “where is your favourite place to be romantic?”. These questions are 
not wholly ‘open-ended’ because the response is one of only a few options and 
delivered in one-word.  A truly open-ended question, for example, “What were you 
doing the night of April 5?” can elicit a response of multiple sentences. The study 
found that the time it took people to start answering multiple-response questions took 
longer than closed questions. In addition, when lying to open questions those who 
lied to every question and those given the choice to lie, took longer to respond (M = 
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1274 ms, SD = 750, and M= 1440 ms, SD = 1242 respectively) than those telling the 
truth (M = 890 ms, SD = 296).  
Building on these results, Walcyzk and colleagues developed a new, 
deception-based RT paradigm; Time Restricted Integrity Confirmation (TRI-Con, 
Walczyk et al. 2005). In their first test of TRI-Con participants were asked 52 
questions, of which only eight required a non-binary response (Walcyzk, Mahoney, 
Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009). Again, the questions described as open-ended 
only required a response consisting of only a few options. For example, ‘In years, 
what is your age?’. Such a response can be any number within the limits of the 
human lifespan, but the response only requires one word. Similar to the 2003 study, 
the results suggested lying takes longer (on average 230 ms longer).  
A later study tested TRI-Con again using different questions (and more 
accurately referred to open-ended questions as ‘multiple-response’; Walczyk, 
Griffith, Yates, Visconte, & Sinoneaux, 2013). Nineteen of the 36 questions were 
multiple response, but again only required a one-word answer – or, at most, a date. In 
this study, they found unrehearsed liars were significantly slower to respond than 
truth-tellers to multiple response questions that were relevant to themselves, by 240 
ms on average. There were few lie RTs recorded, and exactly how many is unknown. 
Of the 36 questions, liars were instructed to lie to only nine of them. Of those nine, 
only six were multiple response and there was no report of how many participants 
were in each condition.  
The cumulative results of Walczyk and colleagues indicate that lying takes 
longer than telling the truth, but there are limitations in the design of these studies. 
The first is that the later studies using TRI-Con adopt between-subjects only designs 
which may lead to generalisation issues. A between-subjects design was unnecessary 
 15 
because the lie condition only required lie response to nine of 36 questions. All 
participants could have been assigned to lie to only nine questions. This would help 
prevent confounding from the myriad individual differences that influence response 
time including social skills, personality, anxiety during testing, and mental health 
status (Walczyk et al., 2005). This much was acknowledged by Walczyk and 
colleagues (2005) in the original study that found a within-subjects design could 
discriminate between lies and truths with very few questions. It was emphasised in 
that study the power of a within-subjects design, but subsequent studies by the same 
team did not heed their own advice.  
Another limitation is that the questions were delivered either by computer 
screen or via an audio recording, even though they could have been asked by an 
interviewer. Deception occurs within a social context, as do forensic interviews. 
Using a computer prompt or an audio recording has the benefit of eliminating 
unwanted variance that comes from interacting with the interviewer. For example, 
social anxiety would be reduced for those made anxious by being interviewed, but 
this comes at the cost of ecological validity.  If behaviour is socially contextual, it is 
unlikely behaviours performed in isolation in front of a computer screen entirely 
reflect the behaviours that would occur in the real world. In addition, many of the 
proposed load inducing factors described in ADCAT’s Action component (e.g., 
attempting to appear honest, and watching for suspiciousness) would be absent. 
The later studies also do not address the issue that yes/no and one-word 
answers are unlikely to reflect deceptive discourse. None of the RT based deception 
designs allow for the construction of narrative lies. The designs continue to rely on a 
bold-face lie/bold-face truth dichotomy. Not only does this model of deception 
inaccurately reflect real world discourse, it also contradicts the very description of 
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deception that ADCAT proposes: lies are embellished as needed. The authors of the 
original ADCM in 2003 argued that trying to build a model of deception based on 
‘narrative lies’ would be inappropriate. The length and complexity of narrative lies 
made accounting for them a “formidable theoretical challenge” (Walczyk, Roper, 
Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003). To date, no progress has been made in this area. 
Finally, these studies only measured how much time it takes for someone to 
answer a question - or the Action component. In doing so, these designs fail to 
capture the cognitive load associated with the Decision and Construction 
components. While ADCAT is the most comprehensive theory of deception and of 
the few that account for the cognitive processes involved, ADCAT currently relies 
on findings with considerable limitations.  
The Present Study 
The present study aimed to address some of these limitations using a new 
methodology enabling the production of narrative lies in a social context. By 
introducing the Detection Response Task (DRT) to the deception literature, the 
present study made it possible to measure RT in both the Construction and Action 
components of a lie.  
The DRT has primarily been used to measure the attentional effects of 
distraction on drivers and has been found to be a simple and sensitive measure of 
cognitive workload (Strayer et al., 2015). The DRT measures the cognitive load 
associated with decision making, sustaining information in WM, and overcoming 
habitual actions (ISO, 2016), all of which are involved in deception. The DRT 
involves the presentation of a stimulus (visual, auditory or tactile) every 3-5 seconds 
to which a person responds by pressing a switch. RTs are calculated from the onset 
of the stimulus to the response. Greater cognitive load is indicated by slower RTs 
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and more failed responses to the stimulus. In a 2017 study, participants completed 
the DRT in three driving related conditions including driving alone in a simulator, 
talking with a passenger, and driving the simulator while talking on a mobile phone 
(Tillman, Strayer, Eidels, & Heathcote, 2017). Drivers who conversed with a 
passenger and on a mobile phone had slower RTs than when driving alone (M = 502, 
M = 505, M = 466 respectively). Our aim was to investigate whether the DRT can 
detect similar cognitive load when constructing and delivering narrative lies.  
The design of the present study follows the argument made by Smith and 
Little (2018); collecting more data points per participant better addresses the 
limitations of null-hypothesis testing than larger participant numbers. Rather than 
conduct a formal power analysis the aim was to minimize measurement error by 
maximising the number of DRT trials, with Castro, Strayer, Matzke and Heathcote 
(submitted) recommending 200 per participant.  
The present study introduced a novel methodology using a series of one-
minute short films as stimuli for structured, open questions. We employed a live 
interview rather than computer-presented questions in order to induce the cognitive 
load associated with impression management. When participants are prompted to lie, 
the ADCAT Construction component occurs when watching the film and the Action 
component occurs when answering questions. As a secondary task, the DRT 
provides measurements of cognitive load throughout the deception process, allowing 
us to measure the relative load associated with the Construction and Action 
components. It was hypothesised that the cognitive demand of constructing narrative 
lies would result in slower DRT RTs and greater failures to respond to the DRT 
stimulus (omissions) in both the Construction and Action phases. In addition, RT 
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was measured using verbal RT (the time to start giving an answer), and it was 
hypothesised that verbal RT will be greater when lying than when telling the truth.  
In keeping with arguments to improve transparency in research, the study was 
pre-registered on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/jt5pg/) and the project 
data has been publicly shared so that others may replicate our results.  
Method 
Design  
The study used a within-subjects experimental design, with two levels of the 
independent variable (a lying condition and a truth telling condition), and three 
dependent variables: DRT RT, the number of DRT omissions and verbal RT.  
Participants 
A stopping rule was applied for data collection for the 10th of August due to 
the volume of data coding required in a fourth-year project. Forty four, first year 
Psychology students (29 females) aged 18-66 (M = 27.1 years, SD = 10.6) were 
recruited and reimbursed with course credit. One participant failed to construct any 
lies, so their data was removed, leaving 43 participants. Ethical approval was granted 
by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee (Appendix 
A).  
Materials 
A tactile DRT device was used, built to conform with ISO standard ISO DIS 
17488 (ISO, 2016). The stimulus was a 10mm diameter vibrating motor (running at 
5V with a specified RPM of 11000) housed in a 3D-printed casing (14mm diameter 
by 7mm height). The stimulus was attached to the participant’s clavicle with 
tape. The stimulus vibrated at random intervals ranging from 3-5 seconds with 
uniform probability. Participants responded to the vibrations with a button (a 6mm 
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metal tactile ball) housed in a 16mm square 3D printed housing. This housing 
was strapped to the index finger of their dominant hand with a Velcro strap. The 
stimulus and response were connected to an Arduino Nano 3.0 compatible 
microcontroller running custom software which interfaced via serial-over-USB to the 
experiment application. Timing was millisecond accurate. 
The Arduino-based software started and stopped the DRT protocol 
by managing stimulus triggering and response collection, and then reported events 
and timing information back to the PC experiment software. The software played, in 
random order, 26, one-minute long YouTube videos that were submitted as entries to 
one-minute film competitions. All videos had a coherent story and were screened for 
explicit content. The experiment software was developed as a C#/WPF .NET 
application and ran on a Windows 10 PC with a 1920x1080 24" monitor. The movies 
ran full-screen. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. After having the task explained to them 
they read the information sheet (Appendix B), filled out a consent form (Appendix 
C), and were set-up in a sound-attenuated room. They were fitted with headphones, 
sat in-front of a monitor and webcam, and fitted with the DRT. Participants were 
instructed that they could tell lies however they came naturally. They could either 
produce a narrative that was completely unrelated to the video or take the main 
themes of the video and change as many details as possible. They were instructed 
that their lies needed to be convincing and plausible. They were also told they would 
have to recall some details of their answers at the end in order to mimic real-world 
situations; lies must be sufficiently memorable so that reporting remains consistent 
over repeated interrogations. 
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They were told that the content of the videos was unknown to the interviewer 
in order to encourage natural lies where the target does not necessarily know they are 
being lied to. However, the interviewer was responsible for finding and screening the 
films so was aware of their content. The interviewer was in an adjacent room in front 
of a webcam enabled computer and interacted with the participant through Skype 
(Skype for Windows 10, Version 8.18.0.6). The interviewer could not see the 
participant’s screen but throughout the experiment the participant and interviewer’s 
faces were visible to each other. Once all participant questions were clarified they 
were instructed to follow the prompt on the screen (“Hold down Ctrl, the left arrow 
for three seconds, and then the space bar to run the next video”; which aimed to 
prevent them skipping ahead) to start the practice trials.  
On the participant’s computer, the software presented each video and 
triggered the activation of the DRT, which ran continuously throughout the 
experiment. Before each of the videos began a cue appeared on the participant’s 
screen instructing them to either lie or tell the truth (e.g., “After the following movie, 
please tell the truth when you reply to the questions.”). At the end of each movie a 
cue appeared (“Now signal to the interviewer that the movie has finished”) with 
either Truth or Lie in bold at centre screen. The interviewer then asked, “Please 
describe as quickly as possible in as much detail as possible, what occurred in the 
video”. Once the answer was completed the interviewer asked: “As quickly as 
possible in as much detail describe the main character”. They were given feedback 
such as “that level of detail is fine”. Or, if the response was only one sentence, the 
participants were instructed to “remember to provide as much detail as you can”. The 
interviewer then asked the participants to follow the screen prompts to begin the 
experimental trials which were of the same format. 
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Sometimes the lies told required the interviewer to alter the question, such as 
“Can you describe one of the characters?” or, if they had described the characters in 
detail in the first response, “Can you describe what they were wearing?”. There were 
no further prompts throughout the experiment. Two questions were asked in order to 
increase the number of verbal RT measures, ensuring there were at least 20 per 
condition, and also to ensure a sufficiently long narrative for the DRT measurements.  
The main experiment consisted of thirteen true and thirteen lie trials that were 
randomly ordered, except that after two consecutive lie or truth trials the software 
always switched to the alternative. A rest break occurred after trial fourteen. After 
the final trial participants were asked to recall details given at the trial that occurred 
before the break and the final trial (e.g., what was the person wearing). Their 
responses to these questions were not recorded as the instruction to make them 
memorable was only to encourage compliance in producing plausible lies. In 
addition, each participant gave unique lies, so quantifying how well they 
remembered them would be difficult. The total length of the experiment averaged 75 
minutes. 
Participants then rated three statements, over five levels from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree, that it was more difficult to tell lies than the truth, that 
they were motivated throughout the task, and that they focused more on the DRT 
than answering questions (see Appendix D). These questions were asked to 
determine three things; how difficult the subjective experience of telling lies was in 
this experiment, whether participants felt motivated to tell convincing lies, and to 
determine if participants consciously focussed more attention on the DRT task than 
the interview.  
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Response Coding 
All analyses used R (R Development Core Team, 2016). The DRT RTs were 
time-locked to the trials by referencing the computer clock readings for each DRT 
response saved in the DRT data file. Verbal RTs were coded using sound files in 
Adobe Audition (Adobe Systems 2018, version 11.1.1.3). By examining the 
waveforms for each trial, the RTs were calculated by manually marking the gap 
between speech at the end of the interviewer’s question and the beginning of the 
participant’s answer.  
Results 
Participants gave a variety of lies, from as little as changing the gender of the 
main character to constructing wholly new narratives. Following the ISO standard 
(ISO, 2016), all DRT RTs faster than 100 ms (1.2% of all responses) and slower than 
2.5 secs (1.2% of all responses) are considered anticipations or omissions and were 
excluded. All data during the practice trials and session break were removed as were 
the RTs immediately before the onset of each movie (as participants had to hold 
down several buttons, which disabled their ability to respond to the DRT).  
Responses were divided into two blocks, First Half (before the break) and 
Second Half (after the break) and entered as fixed effects in order to test for effects 
of practice and fatigue. DRT responses were also divided into ‘lie phase’, either 
Construction (when watching the movies) or Action (when delivering the lie), to test 
for different workload effects consistent with ADCAT and analysed as fixed factors. 
In all analyses the 43 participants and 26 movies were included as additive random 
effects.  
During the experiment the DRT motor was replaced after malfunction, 
raising the possibility that the amplitude of the stimulus it provided may have 
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changed. As stimulus intensity can affect RT (Luce, 1986) we performed additional 
analyses adding a between-subject factor, grouping participants run before and after 
the change and found it did not participate in any significant effects.  
DRT RT and verbal RT were analysed using linear mixed-effect models with 
the R package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Inferential analyses 
of all RT data used a Gaussian error model, so RTs were logarithmically transformed 
before analysis. For DRT omissions, a generalized linear mixed model was used 
assuming a binomial error model and a probit link function. All effects were assessed 
using a Type II Wald chi-square test as implemented by the R car package (Fox & 
Weisberg, 2011). Since we use a common and familiar unit of measurement (time) 
we report simple effect sizes as mean differences and report 95% confidence 
intervals to indicate a plausible range of that effect (Baguley, 2009). 
There were 35362 DRT responses collected across all 43 participants, with an 
average of 822 tactile stimuli events per subject. A visual inspection of histograms 
confirmed all participants DRT RTs were positively skewed as expected.  
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DRT RTs 
Table 1.  
 
DRT RT main and interaction effects 
 Mean (ms) 95% CIs Difference 
Truth 440 438-443 - 
Lie 447 445-449 7ms*** 
Construction 387 382-393 - 
Action 528 520-536 141ms*** 
First Half 437 433-442 - 
Second Half 452 447-456 15ms*** 
Lie phase x Block     
- First half Construct  381 375-387 - 
- Second half Construct 395 390-401 14ms* 
- First half Action 524 516-532 - 
- Second half Action 
Lie condition x Block 
535 527-544 11ms* 
- First half Lie 443 438-448 12ms** 
- First half Truth 431 427-435 - 
- Second half Lie 452 447-448 0ms 
- Second half Truth 452 447-456 - 
First half Lie condition x Lie 
phase 
   
- Construct Lie 385 380-391 8ms* 
- Construct Truth 377 371-383 - 
- Action Lie 541 531-550 31ms*** 
- Action Truth 510 502-517 - 
Note *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p<.001 
 
As per Table 1, RTs were significantly slower when lying than when telling 
the truth c2 (1) = 31.39, p <.001 indicating higher load in the lie condition than the 
truth condition. RTs were also significantly slower in the Action phase than in the 
Construction phase, c2 (1) = 4441.18, p <.001, indicating much higher load for 
reporting than constructing narratives. RTs were slower in the second half of the 
experiment c2 (1) = 30.90, p <.001 indicating a fatigue effect. These main effects 
were qualified by a number of significant interactions. The interaction between lie 
phase and block showed slowing in both the Action and Construction phases in the 
second half, c2 (1) = 6.27, p =.01, further indicating a fatigue effect. The difference 
in the interaction between block and lie condition c2 (1) = 10.32, p =.001, was in the 
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first half, indicating that the load of lying decreased with practice. In light of these 
findings we tested our hypotheses separately for each block.  
In the first half RTs in the lie condition were significantly slower than the 
truth condition both in the Construction, c2(1) = 6.3, p =.012, and Action, c2(1) = 
38.4, p <.001, phases. In contrast, neither effect was significant in the second half, 
c2(1) = 0.2, p =.64 and c2(1) = 1.55, p =.21, respectively.  
DRT omissions 
Table 2  
 
DRT omission main and interaction effects  
 % missed 95% CIs Difference (% 
point) 
Truth 3.6 2.3-5.4 - 
Lie 3.9 2.4-5.9 0.3*** 
Construction 2.1 1.4-2.9 - 
Action 6.2 4.2-8.8 4.1*** 
First Half 3 2.0-4.6 - 
Second Half 
Block x Lie interaction 
- First half Truth 
- First half Lie 
- Second half Truth 
- Second half Lie 
Lie x Construct 
interaction 
- Construct Truth 
- Construct Lie 
- Action Truth 
- Action Lie 
4.5 
 
2.8 
3.3 
4.6 
4.4 
 
2.2 
2 
5.5 
7 
2.9-6.8 
 
2.0-3.8 
3.0-4.7 
3.2-6.3 
3.0-6.2 
 
1.6-3.0 
1.5-2.5 
4.1-7.4 
5.2-9.2 
1.5*** 
 
- 
0.5** 
- 
0.2 
 
- 
-0.2 
- 
1.5*** 
Note *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p<.001 
 
As per Table. 2 the DRT omission rates were consistent with the main effects 
of RT with significant main effects of lie condition, c2 (1) = 12.94, p <.001, of block, 
c2 (1) = 156.25, p <.001, and of lie phase, c2 (1) = 932.18, p <.001. There was also a 
significant interaction between lie condition and block c2 (1) = 7.61, p <.01, similar 
to RT, the effect of lie condition in the first half, c2 (1) = 18.26, p <.001, disappeared 
in the second half, c2 (1) = 0.60, p = 0.440, during the Construction phase. Similarly, 
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in the Action phase, the effect of lie in the first half c2 (1) = 27.81, p <.001, reduced 
considerably in the second half, c2 (1) = 4.62, p = 0.03, giving a stronger indication 
that the load of lying decreased with practice. There was a similar effect to RT 
between lie condition and lie phase, c2 (1) = 14.42, p <.001, indicating the effect of 
load was most marked when actioning a lie. 
Verbal RT 
One participant answered the questions before the interviewer finished 
speaking, so no discernible break in speech pattern could be identified and their data 
was excluded. The audio recording failed for another, so data from 41 participants 
were analysed. No censoring was performed on the verbal RT data as participants 
could prepare their answer while listening to the question and anticipate when it 
finished, so very fast responses are plausible. Similarly, slow responses are plausible, 
and they were not overly influential because the analysis was performed on a 
logarithmic scale where verbal RT distribution was approximately normal. Most 
participants had the maximum number of valid verbal RTs, 52, with one having 45 
and another 50.   
Participants were slower to initiate a response when lying (M = 516, 
95%CI[486,548]) than telling the truth (M = 483, 95%CI[454,514]), c2 (1) = 7.60, p 
=.006. As shown in Figure 1, participants were slower to initiate a response in the 
first (Block 1) and second (Block 2) halves of the experiment when lying than telling 
the truth. However, neither the block effect nor the interaction of block and lie 
condition were significant.  
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Figure 1 Mean verbal RT for true and lie responses during the first (Block 1) and 
second (Block 2) half of the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Means and within-subject standard errors (Morey, 2008) were calculated on the logarithmic scale for RT and the 
resulting points and intervals transformed back to the natural scale for graphing. 
 
Questionnaire 
The majority of participants (41.8% agreed and 37.2% strongly agreed) agreed that it 
was subjectively more difficult to lie than recall the truth and that they were 
motivated to give convincing answers (90.5% either agreed or strongly agreed). The 
majority also disagreed (51% disagree, 25.8% strongly disagree) that they 
consciously focussed more attention on the DRT task than the interview. 
Discussion 
The aim of this research was to investigate whether the DRT can detect the 
cognitive load associated with constructing and delivering narrative lies. Data from 
our experiment very strongly supported our hypothesis that the production of 
narrative lies increases cognitive load, both in the form of slowed responses and 
response omissions to the DRT, and the time it took to initiate a verbal response. 
Participants also reported that lying felt harder. These results are consistent with the 
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deception literature which is dominated by the idea that lying is harder than telling 
the truth.  
For some time, the evidence has been building that RT, as a measure of the 
cognitive load involved in lying, can be a reliable measure of deception. However, 
the majority of research to date has tested this assuming lies are produced in only one 
way: as bold-faced lies. These are usually delivered dichotomously as yes/no, or 
true/false. This structure fails to capture the myriad ways in which lies occur. Lies 
are often narratives that contain mostly truth, and a little deceit. Designing studies 
with questions that only require a dichotomous answer fails to capture deception in 
full. The present results help bridge this gap by indicating that narrative lies also take 
longer. 
To date, inferences about the cognitive load of deception have been made 
based wholly on the delivery of lies, or RT in the Action component of ADCAT. Our 
methodology enabled us to detect the particular load associated with the construction 
of those lies. Consistent with previous findings (Spence et al., 2001; Sartori et al., 
2008; Walczyk et al., 2009; Suchotzki et al., 2017), participants were slower to 
respond to the DRT when actioning a lie than actioning the truth (by 31 ms on 
average) in the first half of the experiment. Although in the Construction phase we 
found a significant difference between lying and telling the truth that difference was 
small and was eliminated with practice. The role of practice may have contributed in 
several ways.  
Rehearsal during the Construction phase is predicted to be a strong moderator 
of deception RT (Walczyk et al., 2014). Greater rehearsal over time is associated 
with faster RT whereas limited rehearsal is associated with slower RT. In the current 
study, for every video, the questions were the same “please describe what happened, 
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and please describe what the main character looked like”. Once familiar with the task 
it is possible that when prompted to lie, participants engaged in effective rehearsal of 
responses to the anticipated questions rather than focus on watching the videos. This 
level of rehearsal may have been enough to reduce the cognitive load evident in the 
first half of the experiment.  
Perhaps the practice effect is indicative of reduced anxiety. Some of the 
cognitive load involved in deception comes from anxiety during questioning 
(Walczyk et al., 2005). The second half of the experiment occurred after a rest that 
for most participants involved chatting with the interviewer. Building rapport at the 
half-way mark coupled with familiarity with the task over time, may have reduced 
the cognitive load related to anxiety.  
Relative to the load evident in the Action component, it is tempting to 
conclude that the Construction component adds limited additional load to the 
deception process. However, the difference may be due to the type of construction 
required in this experiment. One aspect of constructing a plausible lie is not giving 
away information the target would know to be false. Our paradigm did not require 
this of participants. The interviewer and participants are unknown to each other and 
participant believe the interviewer is blind to what they are watching. There is 
therefore no need to try and inhibit information that would be inconsistent with what 
the target knows. Therefore, lie construction in this paradigm may be easier than is 
usually the case. Future designs would need to incorporate an interviewer having 
some prior knowledge about an incident/topic and manipulate the level of rehearsal 
available to participants to determine the full load associated with the construction of 
lies. 
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Verbal RT was slower when lying, but participants only took on average 33 
ms longer than when telling the truth. This is vastly smaller than the 336 ms reported 
by Walczyk and colleagues (2003) in their first attempt to measure ‘open-ended’ 
RTs. This may be due to the significant differences between the designs of that 
experiment with the current study. Critically, the present study involved producing 
narrative lies to an interviewer. There may be linguistic factors that influence the 
speed of response. For example, the use of speech fillers such as ‘uh’ and ‘um’ 
which give us space to decide, construct, and rehearse our speech. These were treated 
equally to all other words that began their speech. Past research has found that 
greater occurrences of and longer ‘um’s’ are discriminative of truth-telling (Arciuli, 
Mallard, & Villar, 2010). It may be worth considering excluding speech fillers when 
calculating verbal RT.  
Or, the social context of telling a lie to a person, rather than a computer may 
influence response time. Our paradigm used a live interview to induce the load 
associated with impression management. Although all modern deception theories 
emphasise the social nature of lying, all RT paradigms so far deliver their questions 
via a computer. The cognitive load induced by impression management should result 
in RTs greater than those achieved by lying to a computer. Our results do not support 
this, but our design was not truly social. The interaction between participants and 
interviewer was mediated by the computer through the use of Skype. This semi-
social design resulted in one participant’s data being removed due to failing to 
conform to the reciprocal rules of communication – they interrupted the interviewer 
to answer as quickly as possible (as was their instruction). In a truly social context, 
this would result in an awkward exchange where the target may start to show signs 
of suspicion. Future research may want to consider designs that mimic an actual 
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interview context on opposite sides of a desk to determine the strength that social 
influences play on deception RT. In addition, that design should include open-ended 
question, and incorporate the elements of prior knowledge and rehearsal discussed 
earlier. It may be possible to detect reliable differences with such a design in a much 
shorter experiment than the current study. By the half way point, most participants 
had been in the experiment for approximately 40 minutes which resulted in pervasive 
fatigue effects from the first half to the second half of the experiment.  
The results of the present study contradict McCornack and colleagues (2014) 
assertion that lying is rarely more demanding that truth telling. According to their 
theory, lies are only harder when they contain the portrayal of complex information, 
are based on the retrieval of decayed semantic memories and are unrehearsed. To 
some extent, the lies told in this study reflect these three conditions. The lies in this 
study were minimally rehearsed and it is possible that some of the lies told rely on 
old semantic memories. Many participants constructed lies that were wholly 
unrelated to the videos. It is likely that in the construction of these lies, participants 
were drawing on memories of their personal experiences. It is less clear whether the 
information portrayed was complex, simply because McCornack and colleagues do 
not define complex in their theory.  
Take for example the following, given as a lie, which did not reflect any of 
the videos in the experiment: 
There was a little girl I think it is her birthday party and her dad invited his 
friend who is a famous singer to join the party. The singer went to their house 
and gave her some presents, and he suggested he could set up some 
decorations and started to blow up some balloons. But, suddenly he had a 
heart attack and he died on the floor. Everyone wondered what they should 
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do with the dead body and realised that they should try and capture his last 
breath because he’s worth a fortune (because he’s very famous) so they try 
and protect the last balloon he blew up. 
Arguably, this portrays a complex narrative. It may be that lies are typically no more 
cognitively difficult than telling the truth, but that our design captured exactly those 
lies that are.  
Limitations 
The interviewer was not blind to the content of the videos. It is possible that 
the interviewer’s attempts at lying to convince participants of this (e.g., laughing 
along when recalling a funny narrative, and acting surprised by a surprising twist that 
was no surprise) impacted the results in some way. If the interviewer was not 
convincing, the participants may have been suspicious and consequently assign 
fewer cognitive resources to appearing convincing themselves. Future studies should 
aim for a double-blind design where lie stimuli are as new to the interviewer as the 
participants.  
What this study did not measure is the decision to lie which forms a major 
part of why lying is more cognitively demanding. According to Walczyk and 
colleagues (2014), the Decision component is the most important and involves a 
complex quasi-rational decision-making process. One previous study found support 
for this process (Masip et al., 2016), but concluded that the Decision component may 
not account for as much cognitive load as ADCAT predicts. In the present study, 
participants were instructed when to lie and when to tell the truth. This was to ensure 
an even number of trials per condition. Therefore, no study has tested the relative 
cognitive load associated with this phase of deception. Follow up research could 
easily adapt the current paradigm to allow participants the choice to engage in this 
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decision-making process. In doing so, it may be possible to determine the relative 
contributions of each ADCAT component to the cognitive load experienced when 
lying. The challenge will be motivating participants to lie. For example, in 
Walczyk’s original study, of those who had the choice of lying or telling the truth, 
the choice to lie only occurred 22% of the time. 
The role of motivation in deception is controversial and it is difficult to 
quantify. We are unable to determine if motivation played a role in reducing RT (as 
would be suggested by assigning greater resources to executive functioning to give 
convincing lies) or increasing it (as suggested by the motivation impairment effect 
where the greater the motivation to seem convincing induces greater stress) because 
there were no consequences for failing to lie convincingly. Laboratory-based studies 
are limited in their ability to induce the high-stakes that occur in criminal 
investigations. Indeed, Suchotzki and colleagues (2017) found that motivation was 
not a key moderating factor in deception RT which may be explained by the low-
stakes involved. In this study, participants were instructed to give as convincing lies 
as possible and more than 90% stated they were motivated to do so. Since the role of 
motivation remains debated in this field, future research could incorporate the DRT 
while manipulating the level of motivation to determine its relative contribution to 
the cognitive load of deception.  
Implications  
Can the DRT be used for lie detection? It is a relatively cheap design to build 
(relative to an fMRI machine) and transport so it would be easily deployable in 
ecological contexts. However, the differences between lying and truth telling here 
were quite small and highly reliant on a large number of RT measurements. In 
addition, using a device such as the DRT to detect deception would be vulnerable to 
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countermeasure. RT are under voluntary control (Sip et al., 2013) and participants in 
our study were unaware that their responses to the DRT were more important than 
producing plausible lies. If slow responses to the DRT were known to infer guilt, 
participants could try to confound their RT results by making consistently slow 
responses. It is unlikely the DRT is the next lie-detection tool.  
What dual-task methodologies like the DRT can provide is a concrete 
grounding for the concept of cognitive load. This grounding could be particularly 
useful in assessing the influential Cognitive Load Approach to lie detection. This 
approach attempts to make involuntary signs of lying more evident through 
manipulations that putatively increase cognitive load, such as recounting stories 
backward (Vrij et al., 2008), unanticipated questions and tasks (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, 
& Leal, 2011), and forcing direct eye contact during interviews (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & 
Fisher, 2010). The DRT could provide a rigorous way to assess which of these 
manipulations increases the cognitive load of lies relative to honest responses. 
The present study has made several important contributions. To the cognitive 
view of deception more generally, our results support the argument that lying is 
harder than telling the truth. In addition, the RT deception effect is not restricted to 
computerised ‘yes/no’, ‘true/false’ paradigms: it also applies to narrative lies. Until 
now, all inferences made about the cognitive load involved in lying has been based 
solely on a model that poorly reflects deceptive discourse. This study demonstrates 
that narrative lies in terms of RT are not the formidable theoretical challenge 
proposed. It also provides a modest, but significant step toward validating the 
Construction component of ADCAT. Until now, only the contribution of the Action 
component to the time it takes to lie had been tested. The temporal nature of the DRT 
made this possible. This study validates the DRT as a sensitive measure of cognitive 
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load in a new applied setting. As a cheap to build, transportable device, the DRT has 
vast potential in improving not only our theoretical understanding of deception but 
also refining lie-detection techniques. 
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Appendix D: Questionnaire  
 
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements: 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly 
Agree 
It was more difficult to construct the 
lies than to tell the truth: 
 
     
I was motivated to give convincing 
answers throughout the task: 
 
     
I focussed more attention on the 
buzzer than responding to the 
questions: 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
